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Abstract 
 
Fiscal policy can affect monetary policy either through debt monetisation or through a direct 
effect on price dynamics.  The former is the conventional classical view rooted in the quantity 
theory of money while the latter is the modern view of the Fiscal Theory of Price 
Determination. Based on the dynamic response of inflation to different shocks, we test the 
relationship between fiscal balances and monetary stability in 10 SADC countries. Results 
show that five out of 10 countries considered here were characterised throughout the period 
1980-2006 by fiscally dominant regimes, with weak or no response of primary surpluses to 
public liabilities.  The remaining five countries exhibit a monetary dominant regime.  The 
study also finds that changes in primary surpluses affect price variability via aggregate 
demand, suggesting that fiscal outcomes could be a direct source of inflation variability, hence, 
the need for policy coordination in the region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding the nature of the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy is central in 
the process of designing institution for macroeconomic stability and growth. In the debate 
about the process of African integration the issue of the correct policy framework that each 
country should follow is an important part of the policy discussion.  
The main preoccupation of policy makers is that undisciplined fiscal policies could jeopardize 
monetary stability for the whole Southern Africa. In a “fiscal dominant” regime, where the 
fiscal authority sets the budget independently of public sector liabilities; a fiscal expansion 
may eventually require monetization, and result in higher inflation. However money creation 
may not be the only channel through which fiscal policy becomes dominant. Fiscal dominant 
regime may also arise when fiscal policy is not sustainable and government bonds are 
considered net wealth.3  The implication is that fiscal policy can be the main determinant of 
inflation. 
This paper tests the nature of fiscal and monetary policy interdependence in SADC.  The main 
objective is to investigate whether fiscal policy is dominating monetary policy and whether 
fiscal instability contributes directly to the price dynamics.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review some of the debate about 
fiscal and monetary policy interdependence, with a particular attention paid to the so called 
Fiscal Theory of Price Determination (FTPD). In the second part, using data for the period 
1980-2006 for 10 Southern African countries, we investigate whether some of the implications 
of the FTPD are indeed a feature of the SADC region. The last section concludes. 
II. THE INTERTEMPORAL APPROACH TO FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
Modern analysis of interdependence between monetary and fiscal policy has a central point of 
reference in the seminal paper by Sargent and Wallace (1981) “Unpleasant Monetarist 
Arithmetic”. The main objective of the paper was to show that, even in a pure monetarist 
framework, unbounded fiscal policy produces negative spillover effects on monetary policy, 
and ultimately it can undermine the ability of monetary policy to control inflation.  
This conclusion largely based on the “assumption” that permanent budget deficits must be 
eventually monetized. Not surprisingly, with an exogenous stream of budget deficits, there is 
only one integral of money creation that is consistent with long run equilibrium (in term of 
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satisfaction of agents trasversality conditions), and the only choice in the hand of the monetary 
authority is the time profile of money creation.  
In the words of Sargent and Wallace: "Without help from the fiscal authorities, fighting current 
inflation with tight monetary policy must eventually lead to higher future inflation”.  
On the other hand, the introduction of rational expectations has the effect of anticipating the 
inflationary pressure at time zero. This eliminates even the possibility of choosing the desired 
time profile of inflation consistent with the long run solvency of the public sector. 
But the most influential result of the Sargent and Wallace contribution has probably been the 
fact that the policy conflict between fiscal and monetary policy could be resolved simply by 
assigning policy leadership to the Central Bank. If it was possible to give the "first move" to 
the monetary authority, then the fiscal authority would be constrained in its policy choice by 
the amount of seignorage provided by the Central Bank. 
In fact, in the Sargent and Wallace model, the monetary authority is the loser of the policy 
game simply because is not able to influence the spending decision of the fiscal authority. 
Sargent and Wallace themselves recognise that the conflict could be resolved with appropriate 
institutional arrangements. As they say "One can imagine a monetary authority sufficiently 
powerful vis-à-vis the fiscal authority that by the imposition of a slower rates of growth of base 
money, both now and into indefinite future, it can successfully constrain fiscal policy by telling 
the fiscal authority how much seignorage it can expect now and in the future". 
A recent stream of research (Woodford 1995,1996 Sims,1993,1995, and Bergin, 1997a, 
1997b), building on previous works of Calvo (1990) and Leeper (1991) among others, has 
renovated the interest in the analysis of the interrelation between monetary and fiscal policy, 
partly questioning the conclusions derived from the Sargent and Wallace approach. The main 
innovation introduced by these contributions is that the interrelation between fiscal policy on 
one side, and monetary policy and the private sector on the other, manifests itself through 
changes in the level of prices that moves to achieve public sector solvency, independently of 
the institutional arrangements between fiscal and monetary authority.  
Variables like net government liabilities and expectations regarding the stream of future 
surpluses are given an immediate role in the determination of the equilibrium price level. If the 
government's solvency condition were not satisfied at a particular point in time, (i.e. the stream 
of current and expected future surpluses would not pay the existing debt) price will move to 
ensure that it does hold.  
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The first goal of this approach to monetary and fiscal policy interdependence is to derive 
conditions under which the level of price is determined even in a regime of nominal short run 
interest rate targeting. In the quantity theory tradition, when the monetary authority targets the 
nominal interest rate, it supplies any amount of money demanded by the private sector. Given 
that the demand of money is a demand for real money balances, a given quantity of real money 
can be determined by an infinite number of combinations of nominal money supply and prices, 
producing indeterminate levels of prices and money stocks (Patinkin, 1961, Sargent and 
Wallace, 1975). On the contrary, the fiscal theory of price determination (FTPD) finds an 
anchor for the price level in the dynamics of expected future fiscal surpluses.  
The basic mechanism behind the theory can be illustrated using an infinite horizon model with 
money in the utility function similar to the one used by Bergin(1997).In this model, a 
representative agent solves a standard optimisation problem,  
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where all the variables have the standard meaning, it is the nominal interest rate, the income Yt 
is an independent and normally distributed positive random variables and τ is a lump sum tax 
imposed by the government. The government budget constraint, expressed in nominal term, is:  
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The government must fix two of the five variables in (3), or define a function for each of them, 
in order for the model to be complete. The other three variables will then be determined by the 
private agent first order conditions. The F.O.C are given by: 
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Suppose that the government follows a policy of nominal interest rate targeting and fixes i and 
the level of taxes. Then the government budget constraint divided by PtCt is given by: 
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Taking the expectations of (7) and using the private sector FOCs and the fact that in 
equilibrium is C=Y, we have (using condition 5 and 6): 
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Equation (8) is an unstable difference equation (β<1), with the last term representing the 
expected constant seignorage revenues, given the policy pegging nominal interest rate. 
Condition (8) has a single stable solution, as: 
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where ξ is the constant term in equation (8). Given the level of taxes and the nominal interest 
rate, (9) is the only value of real debt compatible with the solvency of the public sector. 
Implicitly (9) represents the net present value of expected future surpluses, therefore any 
movement in the present income, or taxes or interest rate will produce a movement in prices 
such that the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector is satisfied. Substituting this 
equilibrium value of future surpluses, called Φ, in (7) it is possible to express the movement in 
prices respect the other real variable in the model: 
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Equation (10) shows the relation between income and price dynamics when the government 
follows an exogenous fiscal policy as the one studied by Sargent and Wallace.  
This negative correlation between movements in prices and movement in real income is 
determined only by the particular fiscal policy followed by the Government. A level of income 
greater then its trend value eases the pressure on the level of prices coming from the fiscal side, 
therefore reducing the level of prices itself. On the other hand the fiscal authorities can 
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influence the level of prices via changes in the tax rate with a result that is observationally 
equivalent to the traditional demand effects of fiscal policy of the Keynesian tradition. A 
reduction in taxes increases the wealth effect of the debt outstanding, thus increasing private 
demand and prices until the real value of debt has not came back at its sustainable value.  
The mechanism behind this relation totally depends on the wealth effect of public debt. In what 
is this approach differ from the traditional way to describe the determination of fiscal policy 
effects in a General Equilibrium Model? In building up a general equilibrium model similar to 
the one described above, it is usual practice to close the model with two trasversality 
conditions, one for each agent. On one hand a rational private agent is required to plan is 
consumption-leisure choice in such a way that in the limit he will use all his available 
resources: 
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On the other hand the same condition is also imposed on the behaviour of the government 
derived by integrating forward with a condition like (3), and imposing the final condition 
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where D is the real value of debt issued by the government. As argued by Buiter (1998) "These 
decision rules determine, jointly with the market clearing conditions, initial conditions and 
other system wide constraints, the equilibrium sequences of prices. The Budget constraints 
must be satisfied, however, both for equilibrium and for out of equilibrium sequences of 
endogenous variables in order for these budget constraints to co-determine these equilibrium 
sequences" (pp17-18). But in doing so, the equilibrium is imposed "ex ante", as a condition for 
the formulation of the model itself, and it is not the result, ex post, of possible disequilibrium 
dynamics.  
In the FTPD instead, because the actual fiscal policy is expressed in nominal terms but the 
trasversality condition (11) is expressed in real terms, it is possible that a disequilibrium 
behaviour of the government produces a movement in prices that generates a new equilibrium 
in which (11) is satisfied at an higher nominal debt and an higher level of prices. Only a policy 
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that explicitly follows a Ricardian rule, as defined by (11), produces total independence of 
prices from fiscal dynamics.  
For example, consider the case of a government following a tax policy that adjusts the level of 
taxes to the level of real debt, as: 
t
t
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Substituting this policy rule in the budget constraint (8) we obtain: 
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that is a stable difference equation as long as (1+θ1)β is greater than 1. The meaning of 
equation (13) is pretty obvious: if taxes react to the increase in debt strongly enough, equation 
(13) is stable and a policy of pegging the level of prices does not conflict with the equilibrium 
of the public sector4. 
It is clear that the above approach greatly reduces the role of the monetary authorities in 
determining the price level and, at the same time, casts serious doubt that the independence of 
the central bank should be the sole instrument for price stability. As argued by Posen (1993), 
Central Bank independence is not the instrument for achieving price stability by itself, but is 
the way in which the fiscal authorities have signalled to the market their willingness to stabilise 
the fiscal position, therefore achieving price stability through a change in fiscal stance. On the 
other hand monetary policy independence cannot achieve price stability without a fiscal policy 
coherent with that objective. 
This possible characteristic of monetary and fiscal policy interaction matters when thinking at 
process of economic integration and monetary cooperation. The possibility to delegate 
monetary policy to an independent and supranational institution is not going to provide real 
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a monetary union and concludes that the Maastricht rules are sufficient but not necessary to achieve Ricardian 
fiscal policies. 
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and nominal stability if fiscal policy does not operate in a stabilizing manner. Ultimately the 
issue is an empirical one. Do countries in Southern Africa have a fiscal dominant or a 
monetary dominant regime, or, in other words, is inflation in Southern Africa a monetary or a 
fiscal phenomenon? These are the questions that we will try to answer in the following section.   
III  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
To provide robust evidence on the nature of relationship that exists between fiscal and 
monetary policy, this section develops the following empirical approaches using nonstructural 
VAR.5 
 
● based on the dynamic relationship between government liabilities and primary 
surpluses; we test how fiscal authorities respond to ensure the solvency of the public 
sector; 
● given the role of nominal income in the FD regime, the second approach tests 
whether the positive response of future surpluses to current surpluses is due to lower 
nominal income or not 
● based on the interaction between fiscal and monetary variables, we estimate the 
relative importance of primary surpluses and money growth on inflation; 
 
A. Fist Approach 
 
The first approach follows the methodology used by Canzoneri et al (2001).  This allows us to 
identify Monetary Dominant (or Ricardian) regime or Fiscal Dominant (or non Ricardian) 
regime by estimating how primary surpluses respond to a temporary shock in government 
liabilities, and vice versa.   
Table 2 summarizes the criteria for identifying FD and MD regimes using this approach.  
Consider how a positive innovation in current surpluses passes to the future liabilities.  In a 
MD regime, the surpluses pay off some of the debt and future liabilities fall.  While in a FD 
regime, future liabilities rise.  Again, consider next the case in which an innovation in the 
current surpluses is not correlated with the future surpluses.  In a FD regime, future liabilities 
should not be affected by the innovations in current surpluses.  However, there is also another 
case to consider.  Suppose innovations in current surpluses are negatively correlated with 
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 For a discussion of different approaches to test the FTPD empirically, see among others, Sala (2004), Tanner and 
Ramos (2002), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). 
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future surpluses.  In this case, future liabilities would fall in either a MD or FD regime, and we 
have an identification problem. 
The test is based on impulse-responses analysis of future total government liabilities to a shock 
in current surpluses.  Say for example, there is a shock in the Surplus/GDP, how do both 
variables react.  Identifying these shocks in FD regime is straight forward because the 
Surplus/GDP series is assumed to be exogenous. The first equation of the VAR, which 
describes the evolution of Surplus/GDP, is simply a forecasting equation in which 
Liabilities/GDP enters because of its value in forecasting future surpluses. In MD regime 
instead, Liabilities/GDP influence the setting of future surpluses.6   
 
B. Second Approach 
 
In extension and for robustness check, the second approach analyses the role of nominal 
income in the FD regime.  It tests if the positive response of future surpluses to current 
surpluses is due to lower nominal income or not.  Since the theory of FTPD implies that 
nominal income moves to help balance the present-value budget constraint equation, then, a 
positive innovation in Surplus/GDP would lower nominal income in the same period and raise 
the real value of current government liabilities. To test for this presumption, we split the 
numerator and denominator of Liabilities/GDP, and run a VAR on log of nominal liabilities→ 
log of nominal income→ Surplus/GDP. This is the only ordering that makes sense in a FD 
regime, since log liabilities is predetermined and log nominal GDP is predicted to respond to 
the surplus innovation.  Table 3 summarizes the identifying criteria based on this approach. 
 
 
 
C. Third Approach 
 
Finally, the third approach analyses how inflation variability is directly affected by fiscal and 
monetary aggregates.  The FTPD predicts that, under FD (or NR) regime the main source of 
changes in the price level could be explained primary by the associated wealth effects upon 
private consumption.7   This is because, with a non Ricardian regime, if fiscal authorities are 
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unable to adjust primary surpluses to guarantee solvency of the public sector, the increase in 
nominal public debt to finance persistent budget deficits is perceived by private agents as an 
increase in nominal wealth, leading to higher demand for goods, which raises domestic prices.  
Here, we identify which of the two policy variables ─ money growth or real primary surpluses, 
best explains inflation variability in SADC, after controlling for the aggregate demand channel 
(that is, output gap).8  
 In so doing, a VAR is run with the following causal ordering: nominal domestic debt 
growth→ growth rate of money→ real output gap→ inflation rate.  This ensures that the 
inflation rate is the only variable responding contemporaneously to fiscal and monetary policy 
shocks.  The real output gap is included to control for the effect of aggregate demand onto 
inflation.  Subsequently, variance error decompositions for inflation in each VAR are 
computed.     
 
1V. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS  
 
A. Data 
 
Primary surplus corresponds to government revenue less its expenditure (including net federal 
interest payment) and divided by nominal GDP for the fiscal year.  Total liabilities is 
calculated by adding the net federal debt to the money base both measured at the beginning of 
the fiscal year and dividing by nominal GDP for the fiscal year.   
Data limitation problems meant that Angola, DRC, Mozambique and Namibia had to be 
dropped.  And we concentrate on the remaining ten countries within the region whose data are 
at least available annually for the period, 1980-2006.9   
Most of the data are extracted from the International Financial Statistics, IFS of the IMF and 
SADC website.  For some countries where data on government primary surplus are missing, 
the World Table of the World Bank 1994 and The Europa World Year Book 2004 serve as 
supplement.  In addition, African Development Report 2002 and Earthtrends Data Tables are 
used to supplement data on debt, especially, for Seychelles.   
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 Output gap is estimated using Hedrick Prescott.  The parameter lambda is set to a value of 100 as it is customary 
for annual data 
9
 Three countries are from CMA and seven from non-CMA.   
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B. Unit-Root Test 
 
We investigate the integrating properties of the variables by conducting unit-root tests using 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. This test includes a constant and a deterministic 
time trend (when necessary) with four lags assumed as a starting point. The lag length in the 
ADF regression is selected using the Akaike and Schwarz information criterion. The results are 
presented in table 1. 
The rejection of non stationarity for some variables means that shock to these variables will be 
necessarily temporary, over time, the effects of shocks will dissipate in those countries and the 
series will revert to its long run level.  As such, long-term forecast of those variables will 
converge to the unconditional mean of the series. However, this is not the case for non 
stationary variables. These variables instead have permanent components, and their mean 
and/or variance are rather time dependent. 
Still, it does not matter whether a variable is stationary or not in the Vector Autoregressive 
VAR.10 Sims and others recommend against differencing even if the variables contain a unit 
root.  They argue that the goal of a VAR analysis is to determine the interrelationships among 
the variables, not the parameter estimates. So we should not expect any bias in our analysis 
because of non stationary variables.  . 
 
C. Analysis 
 
This section presents the results of the three econometric approaches to identify Fiscal 
Dominant and Monetary Dominant regimes in SADC region.  Table 4, 5 and 6, and figure 1 
summarize, respectively, the various approaches described above.  The second and third 
columns of table 4, shows the sign of the responses of future real liabilities to a shock in 
current real surpluses in both the first and second ordering of the VAR.  The fourth column 
shows the response of future surpluses to current surpluses, the fifth column shows 
autocorrelation sign of the surpluses, and the sixth column identifies the type of regime, FD or 
MD, based on the criteria summarized in table 2.11 
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 See Enders, 1996. 
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 The use of different data sources when extracting total debt for many countries undoubtedly reduces the 
statistical power of these results.  However the use of different econometric tests and approaches to underpin the 
relative importance of monetary and fiscal determinants of inflation should improve the reliability of the results.  
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Of a sample of 10 SADC countries, five are estimated to have followed a FD regime (Lesotho, 
Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe).  The remaining 5 countries exhibit a MD regime 
(South Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania).   
The response of Liabilities/GDP in period 1 to an innovation in Surplus/GDP in period 0 is 
negative regardless of the ordering used for South Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius, Seychelles 
and Tanzania.  This negative response would arise naturally in a MD regime.  As already 
shown in table 2 however, this negative response could also arise in a FD regime if a positive 
Surplus/GDP innovation lowers expected future surpluses sufficiently to reduce the present 
value.  This is not the case here.  The response of future surpluses is positive and significant for 
these countries (Surplus/GDP in period 0 produce a surplus in period 1) so that even more of 
the debt is paid off in period t+1 and future liabilities
 
falls.  
Evidence is much weaker in Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  The 
response of Liabilities/GDP to surplus shock is positive.  As already pointed out, this positive 
response would arise naturally in a FD regime.  
Table 5 summarizes the nominal income analysis results of the second approach.  The second 
and third column of the table shows the sign of the responses of future log of nominal income 
to a shock in current real surpluses in both the first and second ordering of the VAR.  The 
fourth column shows the response of future surpluses to current surpluses, and the fifth column 
identifies the type of regime, FD or MD, based on the criteria summarized in table 3. 
All countries, except Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi, exhibit a positive response of future log 
of nominal income to current real surpluses.  This interpretation is consistent with the one 
given in table 4.  This suggests that the response that our “natural presumption” associates with 
a FD regime is not supported by the data for South Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius, Seychelles 
and Tanzania.  Meanwhile, a FD regime in Zambia and Zimbabwe is more chronic as real 
surpluses generated in both countries are not used for the purpose of reducing their debt.   
Table 6 summarizes the variance error decomposition results, suggesting that inflation 
variability could be mostly explained by real primary surpluses (Mauritius and Tanzania), 
money growth (Swaziland, Lesotho, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and by both 
determinants (Malawi). 
In table 6, second column, reports the regime identified by the previous approaches, while the 
third and fourth columns show the average percentage of inflation variability for eight periods 
due to, real primary surpluses and money growth respectively.  Zimbabwe, for example, is a 
case previously identified as a FD regime.  Under this test, the inflation variability is more 
likely to be associated with changes in money growth (26.0%) than changes in real surpluses 
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(13.9%), suggesting that the type of FD regime in Zimbabwe could be explained by the QTM 
of debt monetisation.  For Malawi, however, which is also a FD regime, the largest variability 
in inflation is associated with both changes in real surpluses (23.5%) and money growth 
(37.6%), indicating that the type of FD regime in Malawi could be best explained by both the 
FTPD and QTM mechanisms.  These results are also presented in figure 1. 
Overall, these results seem to indicate that inflation variability could also be associated with 
changes in real surpluses in countries under a MD regime, implying that real primary surpluses 
matter to price volatility. 
However, until now, we assume that there were no regime switches in our analysis.  But 
eyeballing rolling regression in government expenditure and revenue in figure 2, enables us see 
if there is any significant changes taking place, particularly in the recent period.  Notice the 
difference between 1980-1994 and 1995-2005, for South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland.  
There is evidence of stabilisation policy in the later period than in the former.  Movement in 
government expenditure and revenue is more consistent and positive from 1995.  
Similarly, for years, Botswana and Mauritius exhibit more positive and stable movement in 
both variables.  But, although insignificant, notice the recent negative change taking place in 
Botswana, and a very strong and significant stability that is just occurring in Tanzania.   
There is evidence of destabilisation policy in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.12 While that of 
Seychelles shows a very high random movement in government expenditure and revenue.  But 
we did not attempt to formally identify statistical breaks in the data in order to confirm this, 
which means that one may still need a more concrete evidence to support these changes.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper analyses the fiscal and monetary determinant of inflation in the SADC region.  It 
offers a theoretical model in understanding the implication of the FTPD in a small open 
economy facing borrowing constraints.  It provides quantitative evidence that traces out the 
dynamic response of inflation to different shocks.  In particular, the study finds, as predicted by 
the FTPD, that changes in primary surplus pass through to prices by increasing inflation 
variability.  Therefore, fiscal policy matter for achieving and maintaining price stability in the 
SADC region. 
 
                                                        
12
 Again, although insignificant, notice the recent sign of a change towards stability in Malawi.  
 14 
The paper also provides evidence that FD regimes may arise regardless of how independent 
monetary policy is (like in the case of Lesotho and Botswana).  This highlights the importance 
of coordinating fiscal and monetary policy in the region. 
In general, South Africa, Swaziland, Mauritius, Tanzania and Seychelles seem to have been 
characterised by a MD regime in SADC throughout the period 1980-2006; while Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe seem to have been characterised by a FD regime.  
Finally, countries within the SADC region still need to intensify and redouble their effort 
towards the realisation of a more sustainable fiscal policy.  
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test for Unit Root 
 
Country    Stationary   non Stationary 
  
CMA 
 
South Africa   Psurp and Liab    
Lesotho    Psurp and Liab    
Swaziland   Psurp    Liab   
 
Other SADC 
 
Botswana   Psurp    Liab   
Mauritius   Psurp    Liab   
Tanzania   Psurp    Liab  
Malawi    Psurp    Liab    
Seychelles       Psurp and Liab   
Zambia    Psurp    Liab    
Zimbabwe   Psurp    Liab 
 
Note 
All monetary variables used in the analysis are stationary. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Identification Criteria for Fiscal Dominance (FD) and Monetary Dominance (MD) Regimes 
 
  Criteria               Response of future Liab to current Psurp        Response of future   Auto Psurp   Regime 
       1st Order                2nd Order          Psurp to current Psurp 
 
     C1  negative (–)  negative (–)  positive (+) +     MD 
     C2           non negative (0, +)      non negative (0, +)       non negative (0, +)    +     FD 
     C3  negative (–)  negative (–)  negative (–)          –      Unidentified   
  
Note 
Psurb is government revenue less its expenditure (including net federal interest payment) and divided by nominal GDP. Liab is calculated by 
adding the net federal debt to the money base both divided by nominal GDP. 
1st VAR ordering is Psurp→ Liab, which is consistent with a non Ricardian or FD regime characterized by an active fiscal policy. 
2nd VAR ordering is Liab→ Psurp, which is consistent with a Ricardian or MD regime characterized by a passive fiscal policy and active 
monetary policy. Results are however, consistent under both orderings. 
 
 
Table 3: Identification Criteria for FD and MD based on Nominal Income 
 
Criteria  Response of future income Response of future Psurp  Regime 
  to current Psurp    to current Psurp 
 
C1   negative (–)  positive (+)           FD 
C2             positive (+)  positive (+)   MD 
 
Note 
This is based on the sign of the impulse response function of the following VAR model; output gap→ money growth→ inflation  
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Table 4: VAR on Psurp and Liab 
 
                  Response of future Liab to current Psurp        Response of future   Auto Psurp   Regime 
        1st Order  2nd Order      Psurp to current Psurp 
 
CMA 
 
South Africa  –   +                   +       +        MD  
Lesotho   +   +                +       +        FD     
Swaziland  −   –                +       +             MD 
 
Other SADC 
 
Botswana  +   +   +        +        FD 
Mauritius  −   –   +        +        MD 
Tanzania  −   –   +        +        MD 
Malawi   +   +   +        +        FD 
Seychelles  –   –   +        +        MD 
Zambia   +   +   +        +        FD 
Zimbabwe  +   +   +        +        FD 
 
 
Table 5: VAR on Log of Liab, Psurp and Log of Nominal GDP 
 
         Response of future nominal income to current      Psurp Response of future        Regime 
        1st Order  2nd Order             Psurp to current Psurp 
 
 
CMA 
 
South Africa      0/+       0/+   +       MD 
Lesotho        –       –   +       FD 
Swaziland       0/+       0/+   +       MD 
 
Other SADC 
 
Botswana       –       –   +       FD 
Mauritius       0/+       0/+   +       MD 
Tanzania       0/+       0/+   +       MD 
Malawi        –       –   +       FD 
Seychelles       0/+       0/+   +       MD 
Zambia        0/+       0/+   +       FD 
Zimbabwe       0/+       0/+   +       FD 
 
Note 
VAR Ordering is log of nominal liabilities→ Psurp→ log of nominal income 
 19 
 
Table 6: Variance Decomposition on Inflation Variability 
 
Regime  Inflation variability Inflation variability due 
 due to Psurp                 to money growth 
 
 
CMA 
 
South Africa  MD    1.9%   4.9%   
Lesotho   FD    5.0%   28.9% 
Swaziland  MD    3.8%   19.0% 
 
Other SADC 
 
Botswana  FD    11.9%   15.5% 
Mauritius  MD      7.3%     6.3% 
Tanzania  MD    19.6%   11.8% 
Malawi   FD    23.5%   37.6% 
Seychelles  MD      2.6%   17.0% 
Zambia   FD      3.9%   55.6% 
Zimbabwe  FD    13.9%   26.0% 
 
Note 
VAR Ordering is Psurp→ Nominal money growth→ Real output gap→ Inflation 
The values displayed are average value of the variance decomposition for eight periods 
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Figure 1: Variance Decomposition on Inflation Variability 
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Figure 2: Rolling Regression in Government Expenditure and Revenue (% of GDP) 1980-2005 
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